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How Can There Be Any Sin in 
Sincere? State Inquiries into 
Sincerity of Religious Belief 
Robert E. Charney* 
I. INTRODUCTION — FROM HUTS TO HUTTERITES 
While it is relatively easy to agree that religious “beliefs” should be 
immune from state interference, the protection of religious “practices” — 
the external manifestations of those beliefs — has engendered considera-
bly more controversy. As a nation which prides itself on tolerance and 
pluralism, Canada has struggled since before Confederation1 to find the 
proper balance between inclusion and exclusivity, between equality and 
special status, between neutrality and accommodation. Even before the 
advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 some statutes 
offered exemptions to accommodate the religious beliefs of minorities,3 
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1
 See s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, App. II, No. 5, guaranteeing denominational school rights that existed at Confederation. Since 
the right is based on the pre-Confederation statutes in each province when it joined Confederation, 
the scope of the right is different in every province. In Ontario, these rights were primarily found in 
the pre-Confederation Separate Schools Act, 26 Vict., c. 5 (often referred to as the “Scott Act”) of 
1863, which guarantees public funding of Roman Catholic schools in Ontario. There is a long line of 
cases interpreting the rights guaranteed by s. 93 in Ontario, for example: Tiny (Township) Roman 
Catholic Separate Schools Sect. No. 2 v. Canada, [1927] S.C.J. No. 63, [1927] S.C.R. 637 (S.C.C.); 
Reference re Bill 30, an Act to amend the Education Act (Ontario), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.); Ontario Home Builders’ Assn. v. York Region Board of Education, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 80, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 929 (S.C.C.); Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 
S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.); Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470 (S.C.C.).  
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3
 For example, the School Attendance Act, 1919, 9 Geo. V, c. 77 excused school pupils 
from compulsory attendance on days regarded as “holy” by the church or religious denomination to 
which they belonged (s. 20(2)); the Ontario Fair Employment Practices Act, 1951, 15 Geo. VI, c. 24, 
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and about a dozen such exemptions appear in Ontario and federal legisla-
tion today.4 
In order to deal successfully with religion, the state must first iden-
tify what it is and who may claim protection in its name. In Syndicat 
Northcrest v. Amselem,5 the Supreme Court of Canada held that religious 
beliefs are personal and so cannot be subject to an objective evaluation. 
Justice Iacobucci, writing for the majority, broadly defined freedom of 
religion to include not only belief or conduct “objectively recognized by 
religious experts as being obligatory tenets or precepts of a particular 
religion”, but also personal “religious” or “spiritual” beliefs “irrespective 
of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious 
dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials”.6 Ac-
cordingly, the majority concluded that “a claimant need not show some 
sort of objective religious obligation, requirement or precept to invoke 
freedom of religion”.7 
While the Court recognized that the government may inquire into the 
sincerity of a claimant’s religious belief, it ruled that such inquiries “must 
be as limited as possible” and are intended “only to ensure that a  
                                                                                                             
a precursor of the Human Rights Code, exempted religious organizations from compliance; the On-
tario Labour Relations Act was amended in 1970 (R.S.O. 1970, c. 232) to exempt employees who 
objected because of religious beliefs from joining unions and paying union dues (s. 39).  
4
 Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2, s. 21 (exemption from compulsory attendance on 
“holy” days); Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, ss. 18, 24 (religious organizations do not 
infringe discrimination prohibition in limiting services and employment to their own members); 
Human Rights Code, id., s. 18.1, Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.3, s. 20(6) and federal Civil Mar-
riage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33, s. 3 (allow registered officials to refuse to solemnize or allow sacred 
space to be used to solemnize marriages on the basis of religious objection); Labour Relations Act, 
1995, R.S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A, s. 53, Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, 2008, S.O. 2008, c. 15,  
s. 13 and Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-5, s. 70 (exempt members of bargaining unit from 
paying union dues on the basis of religious objection); Immunization of School Pupils Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c. I.1, s. 3(3) and R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 262, s. 3 (exempt parents who have filed a statement of 
conscience or religious belief from immunizing their children); Farm Registration and Farm Or-
ganization Funding Act, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 21, s. 22 (exemption from farm registration fees on the 
basis of religious objection); R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 616, s. 6 (exempts drivers of horse-drawn vehicles 
from displaying the slow-moving vehicle sign on the basis of religious objection); Pension Benefits 
Standards Act, 1985, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2nd Supp.), ss. 14 and 15 (exempt employees from contrib-
uting to pension plans on the basis of religious objections); Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Regulations, S.O.R./88-361, s. 64 (members may be exempted from some uniform requirements on 
the basis of religious belief); Employment Insurance Regulations, S.O.R./96-332, s. 89 (allows spe-
cial social insurance number assignations for persons who because of religious beliefs are unwilling 
or unable to complete applications for registration). 
5
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amselem (S.C.C.)”]. 
6
 Id., at paras. 43-49. 
7
 Id. However, as will be discussed later in this paper, Bastarache J. in his dissenting opin-
ion advocates an objective test requiring an established and identifiable “nexus” between personal 
beliefs and religious precepts (para. 135). 
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presently asserted religious belief is in good faith, neither fictitious nor 
capricious, and that it is not an artifice. Otherwise, nothing short of a  
religious inquisition would be required to decipher the innermost beliefs 
of human beings.”8 
This test appears to offer broad protection for freedom of religious 
thought and conduct, yet it presents three immediate difficulties. The first 
is the theoretical question of why (and perhaps “whether”) “freedom of 
religion” is being placed on a higher plane than its section 2(a) sidekick 
“freedom of conscience”. The second is the policy question of whether 
the religious practices of a “religion of one”9 merit the same constitu-
tional protection as the practices of a religious community. The third is 
the practical question of whether the state can successfully inquire into 
the sincerity of any claimant’s religious beliefs given the restrictions im-
posed on that inquiry by the Court in Amselem.  
The three questions are interrelated. If both “freedom of conscience” 
and “freedom of religion” are equally protected under Charter section 
2(a), then the scope for using section 2(a) as a basis for claiming an ex-
emption from regulation will be virtually unlimited and the relevance of 
any inquiry into religious sincerity will be more attenuated.10 If, on the 
other hand, freedom of religion is given more protection than freedom of 
conscience, then the state must have some way of distinguishing between 
a sincere religious belief and a sincere conscientious belief. If there are 
collective aspects to freedom of religion, then the state may have a 
higher or more compelling interest in protecting or accommodating the 
practices of an organized or communal religion over a “religion of one”, 
and should have greater latitude to require objective verification of 
shared and corroborated religious beliefs. 
The focus of this paper is on the third question: state testing of sin-
cerity of religious belief. This last question is of significance to 
government because the Court’s broad, subjective definition of religion 
gives virtually every individual who opposes government regulation a 
potential freedom of religion argument if that person can successfully 
assert a personal religious claim. Given sufficient (often economic)  
incentives, individuals will lie about their religious beliefs in order to 
avoid state regulation or to take advantage of special exemptions. My 
                                                                                                             
8
 Id., at para. 52, per Iacobucci J.; see also para. 142, per Bastarache J., dissenting. 
9
 Id., at para. 189, per Binnie J., dissenting. 
10
 See Amselem (S.C.C.), supra, note 5, at para. 39; Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment 
and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 202, at 215 [hereinafter 
“Moon, ‘Religious Commitment and Identity’”].  
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concern is that the restrictions imposed by the Court in Amselem on the 
state’s inquiry into sincerity make it virtually impossible for the province 
to reliably weed out persons with “fictitious” or “capricious” claims and 
this restriction may actually make it more difficult for the state to tolerate 
religious exemptions. What is required is a test that, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, enables the government to offer exemptions to members of 
religious communities while ensuring that the government’s objective 
can still be effectively achieved. 
The state’s ability to reliably test for religious sincerity became a 
central concern in Alberta’s decision to terminate the religious exemption 
from photo-ID driver’s licences, a decision which led to the Hutterian 
Brethren case decided by the Supreme Court last term. In upholding the 
photographic requirement without any religious exemption, the Court 
missed an opportunity to re-evaluate the strict requirements of Amselem 
and to provide the province with more flexibility to offer religious ex-
emptions in the future. 
II. SYNDICAT NORTHCREST V. AMSELEM — THE ODYSSEY BEGINS 
The appellants in Amselem were Orthodox Jews who owned residen-
tial condominium units in a building in Montreal.  The terms of the 
condominium’s by-laws prohibited decorations, alterations and construc-
tions on the balconies of individual units. The appellant Amselem set up 
a “succah” on his balcony for the purposes of fulfilling a biblically man-
dated obligation during the nine-day Jewish religious festival of Succot.11 
After Mr. Amselem put up his succah in September 1996, the syndicate 
of co-ownership, Syndicat Northcrest, requested its removal, claiming 
the succah was in violation of the condominium’s by-laws. As an alterna-
tive in future years, the Syndicat proposed to allow Mr. Amselem, in 
conjunction with the other Orthodox Jewish residents of the building, to 
set up a communal succah in the building’s gardens. 
 
                                                                                                             
11
 The Court describes the succah as follows:  
A succah is a small enclosed temporary hut or booth, traditionally made of wood or other 
materials such as fastened canvas, and open to the heavens, in which, it has been ac-
knowledged, Jews are commanded to “dwell” temporarily during the festival of Succot, 
which commences annually with nightfall on the fifteenth day of the Jewish month of 
Tishrei. This nine-day festival, which begins in late September or early- to mid-October, 
commemorates the 40-year period during which, according to Jewish tradition, the Chil-
dren of Israel wandered in the desert, living in temporary shelters 
Amselem (S.C.C.), supra, note 5, at para. 5.  
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The appellants rejected the Syndicat’s proposed accommodation:  
They explained why a communal succah would not only cause extreme 
hardship with their religious observance, but would also be contrary to 
their personal religious beliefs which, they claimed, called for “their 
own succah, each on his own balcony” …  
[The appellants] undertook to set up [their succahs] “in such a way that 
they would not block any doors, would not obstruct fire lanes, [and] 
would pose no threat to safety or security in any way”.12  
When the Syndicat, in turn, refused the appellants’ counter-proposal, the 
appellants set up their succahs in defiance. The Syndicat then “filed an 
application for permanent injunction prohibiting the appellants from set-
ting up succahs and, if necessary, permitting their demolition. The 
application was granted by the [Quebec] Superior Court.”13 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed Mr. Amselem’s 
appeal, holding that the condominium by-law violated his freedom of 
religion by preventing him from building his own succah on his balcony. 
Since he held a sincere religious belief that building a succah had reli-
gious significance (whether or not he believed that he was obliged to 
build his own succah), the practice was protected by freedom of religion. 
In contrast, the condominium’s reasons for prohibiting the succah 
amounted to no more than “the potential annoyance caused by a few suc-
cahs being set up for a period of nine days each year”, a concern that the 
Court characterized as “quite trivial”.14 The majority concluded that “the 
argument of the respondent that nominal, minimally intruded-upon aes-
thetic interests should outweigh the exercise of the appellants’ religious 
freedom is unacceptable”.15 
Since the dispute in Amselem was between two private parties, it was 
not a Charter case, but arose under section 3 of the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms,16 a compendious provision guaranteeing:  
Every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, 
freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of 
association.  
                                                                                                             
12
 Id., at paras. 14-16. 
13
 Id., at para. 17. 
14
 Id., at para. 86. 
15
 Id., at para. 87. 
16
 R.S.Q., c. C-12. 
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The focus of the analysis was “freedom of religion”, which, the Supreme 
Court stated, is subject to the same principles whether “an individual  
alleges that his or her freedom of religion is infringed under the Quebec 
Charter or under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”.17 
Throughout its decision, the Court indicates that the principles estab-
lished in Amselem will also apply to cases brought against the state under 
the Charter.  
This particular aspect of the Amselem case has proven to be short-
lived. As we will see when we consider the Hutterian Brethren case, the 
Court soon realized that there are important differences, at least at the 
justification stage, between the kind of claims brought against private 
parties under human rights legislation and claims against legislation 
brought under the Charter. This is because the relationship between pri-
vate parties (e.g., co-owners of a condominium in the Amselem case) and 
the relationship “between a legislature and the people subject to its 
laws”18 are different and require a different balancing of interests. The 
significance of the distinction between private acts and public policy did 
not arise in the Amselem case, and so it is not entirely surprising that the 
majority did not give it any consideration. I will return to this distinction 
later in this paper.19 
One particularly interesting aspect of Amselem was the doctrinal de-
bate which unfolded in the trial court between two rabbis, both qualified 
as experts in Jewish law. The trial judge preferred the testimony of Rabbi 
Levy, who was of the opinion “that there is no religious obligation re-
quiring practising Jews to erect their own succahs”, and that “[t]here is 
no commandment as to where they must be erected.”20 Rabbi Ohana, the 
expert for Mr. Amselem, agreed that there is neither an obligation to have 
one’s own succah, nor a rule on where the succah should be located. 
However, he opined that without one’s own succah at home, the practis-
ing Jew is required to go somewhere else for the proper observance of 
Succot. This transforms the joyous festivity21 into actual labour or obli-
                                                                                                             
17
 Amselem (S.C.C.), supra, note 5, at para. 37. 
18
 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567, at para. 69 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren (S.C.C.)”]. 
19
 See text at note 54, infra. 
20
 Amselem (S.C.C.), supra, note 5, at para. 65, citing Syndicat Northcrest c. Amselem, 
[1998] J.Q. no. 1959, at paras. 88-90 (Que. S.C.) [hereinafter “Amselem (Que. S.C.)”]. 
21
 The Superior Court of Quebec describes Succot as “une occasion de réjouissance”. As a 
point of interest, Le grand dictionnaire terminologique, of the Office québécois de la langue fran-
çaise translates “réjouissances” as “cakes and ale”, online at: <http://www.granddictionnaire.com/ 
btml/fra/r_motclef/index800_1.asp>. 
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gation, thus losing sight of the whole spirit and purpose of Succot.22 The 
Quebec Superior Court found this opinion to be “too subjective”.23  
Notwithstanding this Talmudic dispute between the experts, it was ac-
cepted that Mr. Amselem (although not all of the other appellants) held 
the personal religious belief that he was obliged to erect the succah on 
his own property.24 
The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court was 
wrong to try to resolve the dispute between two competing religious au-
thorities on a question of Jewish law in order to determine whether the 
claimant’s beliefs were “objectively defined religious obligations”.25 Jus-
tice Iacobucci, writing for the majority, explained that  
religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs 
connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to 
one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which 
allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the 
subject or object of that spiritual faith.26  
Therefore it did not matter whether Mr. Amselem’s belief was an official 
doctrine or an idiosyncratic interpretation of the obligations imposed by 
his faith.  
Noticeably lacking from this definition of religion is any connection 
to a community of fellow-believers. This emphasis on individualism was 
no mere oversight, as Iacobucci J. explained that freedom of religion  
“revolves around the notion of personal choice and individual autonomy 
and freedom”27 and “one that is integrally linked with an individual’s 
self-definition and fulfilment and is a function of personal autonomy and 
choice”.28 The collective aspects of freedom of religion played no part in 
Iacobucci J.’s analysis of section 2(a).29 
                                                                                                             
22
 Amselem (Que. S.C.), supra, note 20, at paras. 91-93. 
23
 Id., at para. 93; Amselem (S.C.C.), supra, note 5, at para. 23. 
24




 Id., at para. 39. 
27
 Id., at para. 40. 
28
 Id., at para. 42. 
29
 Benjamin L. Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” in Richard Moon, ed., Law 
and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2008) 264, at 269 [hereinafter “Ber-
ger, ‘Law’s Religion’”]. Berger reviews a number of earlier decisions on religion and concludes 
“that the dominant thread in the Court’s definition and discussion of religion is its focus on religion 
as a fundamentally individual phenomenon” (at 268). “Since Big M, the clear and consistent juris-
prudential message has been that religion has constitutional relevance because it is an expression of 
human autonomy and choice” (at 274). The test for religious sincerity established by the majority in 
Amselem is consistent with Berger’s view that “for the law, what counts as religious is that which is 
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Significantly, the communal aspects of freedom of religion do appear 
to play a role in Bastarache J.’s dissenting opinion. Professor Moon sug-
gests that Bastarache J.’s requirement that the individual’s belief be part 
of an established religious belief system  
may rest on the view that freedom of religion protects religious or 
cultural minorities within the community, and not simply, individual 
conscience in moral or spiritual matters. … Justice Bastarache may be 
drawing on a different conception of religion, and religious commitment; 
one that emphasizes the social and institutional character of religion, and 
regards religious belief not simply as a personal matter, but as tied to an 
established system and an institutional structure.30  
The individual/communal dichotomy would return to play a greater 
role in the Hutterian Brethren case. 
It was on the basis of this private/individual conception of religion 
that the majority rejected any judicial inquiry into the objective validity 
of the claimant’s religious beliefs:  
… these decisions and commentary should not be construed to imply 
that freedom of religion protects only those aspects of religious belief 
or conduct that are objectively recognized by religious experts as being 
obligatory tenets or precepts of a particular religion. Consequently, 
claimants seeking to invoke freedom of religion should not need to 
prove the objective validity of their beliefs in that their beliefs are 
objectively recognized as valid by other members of the same religion, 
nor is such an inquiry appropriate for courts to make.31 
The majority posited a definition of freedom of religion which es-
chewed any relationship to official religious dogma:  
… freedom of religion consists of the freedom to undertake practices 
and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an 
individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely 
undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his 
or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or 
                                                                                                             
meaningful to the individual; institutions and collective traditions are only of derivative importance 
to the law” (at 270). In “An Exemption for Sincere Believers: The Challenge of Alberta v. Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony” 56 McGill L.J. (forthcoming 2011), Sara Weinrib argues that despite 
the individualistic language in Amselem, the decision also requires individual beliefs to emerge from 
community identification to merit s. 2(a) protection. 
30
 Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity”, supra, note 10, at 208-209. This connec-
tion to “an established system and an institutional structure” bears a close resemblance to the 
conception of religion recognized in the denominational school rights protected by s. 93 of the Con-
stitution Act, 1867; see supra, note 1. 
31
 Amselem (S.C.C.), supra, note 5, at para. 43. 
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belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with 
the position of religious officials.32  
Therefore the state is restricted to testing the “sincerity” (e.g., hon-
esty) of the claimant’s religious belief, but even this test is seriously 
circumscribed. The Court’s decision rejects the only two objective crite-
ria that may practicably be available to the state to test sincerity: 
consistent practice and expert opinion. Thus, while the court may con-
sider whether the claimed religious belief is “consistent with his or her 
other current religious practices”,33 past practices are out of bounds. The 
court should not  
… focus on the past practices of claimants in order to determine 
whether their current beliefs are sincerely held. Over the course of a 
lifetime, individuals change and so can their beliefs. Religious beliefs, 
by their very nature, are fluid and rarely static. A person’s connection 
to or relationship with the divine or with the subject or object of his or 
her spiritual faith, or his or her perceptions of religious obligation 
emanating from such a relationship, may well change and evolve over 
time. Because of the vacillating nature of religious belief, a court’s 
inquiry into sincerity, if anything, should focus not on past practice or 
past belief but on a person’s belief at the time of the alleged 
interference with his or her religious freedom.34 
Nor is expert evidence relevant to this determination:  
Since the focus of the inquiry is not on what others view the claimant’s 
religious obligations as being, but rather what the claimant views these 
personal  religious “obligations” to be, it is inappropriate to require 
expert opinions to show sincerity of belief. An “expert” or an authority 
on religious law is not the surrogate for an individual’s affirmation of 
what his or her religious beliefs are. Religious belief is intensely 
personal and can easily vary from one individual to another. Requiring 
proof of the established practices of a religion to gauge the sincerity of 
belief diminishes the very freedom we seek to protect.35 
Even the Court’s permitted examination of current religious practices 
could create an unfair test for a sincere believer whose current religious 
practices fall short of his or her sincere beliefs. Human nature being what 
it is, I suspect that the practices of even the most devout among us will 
                                                                                                             
32
 Id., at para. 46. 
33




 Id., at para. 54. 
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often fall short of his or her spiritual aspirations. Few individuals could 
withstand a charge of religious hypocrisy if the state had the ability to 
thoroughly examine their conduct and measure it against their beliefs. 
Freedom of religion is guaranteed to sinners as well as saints,36 and, if 
the Court’s concerns about past practice are taken seriously, they might 
just as well apply to current practices.  
The real difficulty with the Court’s test in Amselem is that the test 
works only when the conduct in question — here, the building of a suc-
cah — is exclusively religious. It is highly unlikely that anyone would 
build or dwell in a succah for any reason other than religious belief, and, 
in any event, the potential harm from such conduct is, as Iacobucci J. 
found, insignificant. Since there are no ulterior motives for building a 
succah, it was easy for the majority to create a religious sincerity test that 
weighed heavily on the side of the claimant. However, given the Court’s 
express desire to avoid a “religious inquisition”,37 how can the govern-
ment actually test religious sincerity in cases where the conduct at issue 
is not exclusively religious and where the potential harm is more signifi-
cant? How can the state create a religious exemption that will apply only 
to the true believers, but will not exempt false claims of religious belief, 
such as claims based on personal, political or philosophical concerns 
(which may qualify as “conscience” but not “religion”, yet may be easily 
confused with or disguised as “religion”), and “overnight” conversions of 
convenience designed to evade regulatory compliance or even to engage 
in criminal behaviour? How can the state establish a test for religious 
sincerity that can operate on an administrative level without the need for 
lengthy trials or inquisitions? 
The test set out in Amselem, however appropriate for the context of 
that case, may actually make it more difficult for the province to offer a 
religious exemption for minority communities because it makes it too 
easy for persons with “fictitious” or “capricious” claims38 to also qualify 
for an exemption. The state does not have a “window into men’s souls”.39 
                                                                                                             
36
 In this regard see Daly v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1997] O.J. No. 5040, 38 O.R. (3d) 
37 (Ont. Gen. Div.), which considered whether Roman Catholic separate schools had the right to 
prefer Roman Catholics when hiring teachers. In response to the argument that the evidence demon-
strated that Roman Catholic separate schools did not consistently hire Roman Catholic teachers, the 
Court stated (at 82): “A constitutional guarantee is an ideal but must function in a human context. 
This means that it will almost certainly never be fully realized. The failure of a human institution to 
achieve perfection surely cannot defeat the ideal of the guarantee.” 
37
 Amselem (S.C.C.), supra, note 5, at para. 52. 
38
 Id.  
39
 Queen Elizabeth I: “I have no desire to make windows into men’s souls.” 
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Unless the province can rely on the kind of objective criteria apparently 
rejected by the Court in Amselem, it cannot practically offer a religious 
exemption without threatening the integrity of the regulatory scheme. To 
illustrate this point I will digress from the Supreme Court of Canada, and 
examine briefly the case of Mr. Bothwell. 
III. BOTHWELL V. ONTARIO 40 — A BELIEVER IN SEARCH  
OF A RELIGION 
Ontario has required a digital photo driver’s licence card since 
199541 in order to provide enforcement agencies with a reliable means of 
identifying drivers and to reduce the number of unqualified and unau-
thorized drivers on the road. In addition to improving road safety, the 
photo ID assists in maintaining public security when laying traffic 
charges, investigating motor vehicle collisions and conducting other en-
forcement duties. Digital photo driver’s licences enable officers to 
identify those drivers who are suspended or who have falsified, altered or 
counterfeited licences. Without a photo on the driver’s licence, police 
cannot rely on the driver’s licence as proof of identity because people 
can easily forge and tamper with the licence. The lack of a photo makes 
it difficult for the province to effectively employ driver’s licence suspen-
sions to combat drinking and driving and Highway Traffic Act offences. 
The digital photo driver’s licence is difficult to tamper with and has be-
come the North American standard for driver’s licences. 
Although digital photos are essential to the integrity and security of 
Ontario’s driver licensing scheme, Ontario established a policy that per-
mitted Permanent Valid Without Photo (“PVWP”) licences where a driver 
objected on religious grounds to having his or her photo taken. This ex-
emption is not granted lightly. To be considered for a permanent 
exemption from the photo requirement on religious grounds, an individual 
must complete an Application for Photo Exemption form. For an applica-
tion to be approved, the applicant must establish that she is a member of a 
registered religious organization that prohibits its members from being 
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photographed for religious reasons, and the application for an exemption 
must be supported and substantiated by the individual’s religious leader 
and the provision of actual scriptural passages to substantiate the religious 
prohibition. In other words, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate a 
shared and corroborated religious belief. 
Ontario’s PVWP criteria are designed to provide objective and de-
monstrable guidelines that permit exemptions for individuals who object 
on religious grounds to having their photo taken, without opening the 
door to a large number of permanent exemptions that could threaten the 
integrity of the driver’s licensing regulatory scheme. In the absence of 
these criteria, individuals who are tempted to misuse the driver’s licence 
identification card for illegal purposes may succeed in obtaining exemp-
tions. From an administrative perspective, the PVWP criteria enable the 
province to deal with exemption applications without compromising the 
important objectives of driver’s licence photos. While strict, the policy 
concern is that an alternative process could open the door to fraudulent 
applications and make PVWP licences too accessible to individuals who 
object to the photo requirement not based on religious belief but rather 
based on other concerns such as privacy or because they intend to evade 
regulatory compliance or engage in criminal activity.  
Since the PVWP policy was introduced in 1986, Ontario has received 
approximately 75 applications for permanent exemptions from the photo 
requirement.42 Ontario has to date not granted an exemption, as appli-
cants either have not met the Ministry’s criteria or have not completed 
the application process.43 
Prior to the change to digital photographs in 1995, Mr. Bothwell had 
a driver’s licence with a Polaroid photograph. When he applied for a li-
cence renewal in 1997, he noted that the licensing office was using a 
digital camera with a cable connected to a computer. He refused for reli-
gious reasons to having a digital photograph taken and applied for a 
PVWP. His application was denied because he was unable to establish 
that he was a member of a registered religious organization that prohibits 
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 It is reasonable to assume that relaxing the criteria to allow for exemptions on the basis of 
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its members from being photographed for religious reasons. Mr. Both-
well was a parishioner in the Anglican Church. When he found out about 
the government’s exemption policy “he began to search for a congrega-
tion to join that had a religious objection to photographs, without 
success”.44 Accordingly his application for an exemption was not sup-
ported or substantiated by a religious leader, and it was denied.  
Mr. Bothwell claimed that Ontario’s PVWP criteria were inconsistent 
with the “sincerity” test established by the Supreme Court in Amselem. 
He pointed out that, according to Amselem, the only issue was whether 
his objection to digital photographs was based on a sincere religious be-
lief, and he swore that it was. That he had previously consented to 
Polaroid pictures, that he was not a member of religious organization that 
prohibited him from having a digital picture taken, that he could find no 
religious leader to support or substantiate his religious claim, were, ac-
cording to Amselem, all irrelevant and inappropriate considerations.  
Yet Mr. Bothwell’s claim to a religious exemption was defeated by 
hubris. During the course of his court case, Mr. Bothwell participated in 
a news conference with his lawyer where he voluntarily submitted to 
having his picture taken, even though he was “aware that major news 
outlets … bank their digital photos and post them on the Internet”.45 This 
fact, together with a number of other inconsistencies in his conduct and 
testimony, led the Divisional Court to conclude that his objection to the 
digital photograph on his driver’s licence was not based on a sincere reli-
gious belief. 
While the Court’s conclusion in Bothwell would appear to contradict 
my point — that it is virtually impossible for the state to challenge a 
claim of religious sincerity — the fact is that in the Bothwell case the 
province got lucky because Mr. Bothwell slipped up. Had Mr. Bothwell 
not voluntarily participated in the press conference, it is unlikely that the 
cumulative evidence in his case would have been sufficient to undermine 
his claim of a sincere religious belief on a strict application of the princi-
ples established in Amselem. Future, more sophisticated claimants are 
unlikely to make the same overt mistakes as Mr. Bothwell. Even Mr. 
Bothwell is unlikely to make the same mistake again.  
Finally, the province must be able to establish a test that can be ap-
plied by the staff at the Ministry of Transportation responsible for 
reviewing the exemption applications without the need to engage in a 
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protracted inquiry or investigation. While Mr. Bothwell’s inconsistencies 
were exposed in the context of a cross-examination by skilled counsel 
(arguably the very sort of “inquisition” rejected by Iacobucci J. in Amse-
lem), they would never have come to light if he had not brought a court 
case challenging the government’s application process. Indeed, the fact is 
that in Mr. Bothwell’s case the requirement that the applicant demon-
strate “a shared and corroborated religious belief” on his application for a 
PVWP licence did succeed in filtering out an individual who the Court 
ultimately concluded, on the basis of the evidence before the Court, was 
not a sincere religious believer. In the absence of the objective criteria on 
the PVWP application, the government would have had no basis for de-
nying his application and it is likely that Bothwell would have succeeded 
in obtaining his PVWP.46 
Governments must have some way to reliably test for religious sin-
cerity, preferably without the need to hire private investigators to catch 
the claimant in some inconsistent conduct or behavioural lapse. And this 
brings us back to the case of the Hutterian Brethren. 
IV. HUTTERIAN BRETHREN OF WILSON COLONY — THE  
RESURRECTION OF PROPORTIONALITY 
Driver’s licence photographs were introduced in Alberta in 1974. 
Until 2003 Alberta permitted a religious exemption from its photo-ID 
driver’s licence requirements. Unlike in Ontario, there was a minority 
religious group in Alberta, the Hutterian Brethren, whose members regu-
larly applied for this exemption. Approximately 250 of them qualified for 
it. The Hutterian Brethren hold a genuine religious belief that having 
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 The concern regarding false claims for religious exemptions is not unique to driver’s li-
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their photograph willingly taken violates the Second Commandment47 
and is therefore a sin. The province took no issue with the sincerity of 
that religious belief. The Hutterian Brethren also hold a genuine belief in 
communal property, and, as a result, live together in rural colonies. The 
Wilson Colony had 142 members. The evidence was that although the 
colonies attempt to be self-sufficient, certain members must drive regu-
larly on provincial highways in order to facilitate the sale of agricultural 
products, purchase supplies and transport members to medical appoint-
ments. The members of the Wilson Colony claimed that  
… if they are unable to drive it will be impossible for them to continue 
this communal way of life, and that they are therefore being forced to 
choose between two of their religious beliefs: adhere to not having their 
photo taken or adhere to living a communal life and perform their 
assigned duties within the colony.48  
In 2003 Alberta moved to new digital photo technology, and deter-
mined that it could no longer continue to offer the religious exemption 
from the photo requirement. The purpose of the mandatory photograph 
was primarily to reduce identity theft. The photograph taken at the time 
of the issuance of the licence is included in the province’s database and 
facial recognition technology is used to compare the photograph to all 
other photographs in the system to ensure that no one has more than one 
licence in the system. Since the driver’s licence has become the generally 
accepted identity document in our society, it has become a “breeder 
document” for identity theft and the creation of false identities. Facial 
recognition technology ensures that a person renewing or replacing a 
driver’s licence is the person to whom the licence is issued and will dis-
close whether a licensee holds another licence under a different name. 
When the case was argued before the Alberta Court of Appeal, the is-
sue arose as to whether the exemption of only the Hutterian Brethren 
would threaten the security of the photo-licence scheme. The Hutterian 
Brethren are a discrete community with a long-established and easily 
verified sincere religious objection to being photographed. Alberta ac-
knowledged that its concern was not with the few Hutterian Brethren in 
the province, but “it worries that a large number of other applicants will 
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try to take advantage of the photo exception if it is reintroduced. It claims 
that some of these applicants may attempt to exploit the system by mak-
ing false religious claims”.49 This is indeed a valid concern. Given the 
value of a photoless driver’s licence to persons seeking to circumvent 
licence suspensions or who would use the photoless licence to commit 
identity theft or other fraud, it is likely that unscrupulous persons would 
try to take advantage of a general religious exception. The easier it is to 
get away with a false claim, the more false claims will be made. The 
province relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Amselem to support 
its reluctance to maintain a general religious exemption: 
In addition, the Province says that its ability to verify the credence of 
religious beliefs has been significantly reduced by the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada [Amselem, supra, note 5]. In that case, a 
majority of the court held that religious beliefs are personal and are not 
subject to an objective evaluation … Rather, all that is required is a 
sincere religious belief which calls for a particular line of conduct … 
According to the Province, the subjective nature of this inquiry 
significantly restricts its ability to probe the beliefs of an individual 
seeking a non-photo exception and increases the likelihood of falsified 
claims. Furthermore, it says that the finding in Amselem prevents a 
Registrar from requiring a letter from a religious leader verifying the 
applicant’s beliefs, and that requirements to this effect in other 
provinces are unconstitutional on that basis. As a result, the only way to 
ensure the integrity of the licensing system is to impose the absolute 
photo requirement.50 
The most obvious alternative to a general religious exemption would 
be a specific exemption for the Hutterian Brethren, or an exemption 
which would apply only to individuals who, like members of the Wilson 
Colony, could demonstrate a shared and corroborated religious belief. 
However, as Alberta argued in the Court of Appeal, these alternatives 
appeared to be precluded by the individual/subjective analysis estab-
lished in Amselem.  
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Alberta’s photo-ID 
requirement infringed the section 2(a) rights of the members of the Hut-
terian Brethren of Wilson Colony, but the majority held that the 
infringement was justified under Charter section 1. No one questioned 
that the first element of the Charter section 2(a) was met — that “the 
claimant sincerely believes in a belief or practice that has a nexus with 
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religion”. The majority proceeded on the assumption that the second 
element of Charter section 2(a) was also met — that “the impugned 
measure interferes with the claimant’s ability to act in accordance with 
his or her religious beliefs in a manner that is more than trivial or insub-
stantial”.51 
The majority recognized that the broad scope of freedom of religion 
means that: 
[m]uch of the regulation of a modern state [will have] more than a 
trivial impact on a sincerely held religious belief. Giving effect to each 
of their religious claims could seriously undermine the universality of 
many regulatory programs.52  
The province’s objective — to prevent identity theft and fraud and the 
various forms of mischief which identity theft may facilitate — was 
pressing and substantial, and the universal photo requirement was ration-
ally connected to that purpose.  
The majority concluded that “the evidence discloses no alternative 
measures which would substantially satisfy the government’s objective 
while allowing the claimants to avoid being photographed”. This was 
because permitting “an unspecified number” of religious exemptions 
would mean that the “one-to-one correspondence between issued li-
cences and photos in the data bank would be lost”;53 and this disparity 
could be exploited by persons committing identity theft. 
Nor did the legislature have a “duty to accommodate” the religious 
practices of the members of the Wilson Colony when it established manda-
tory digital photographs. The Chief Justice explained that “a distinction 
must be maintained between the reasonable accommodation analysis un-
dertaken when applying human rights laws, and the s. 1 justification 
analysis that applies to a claim that a law infringes the Charter”.54 The 
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concept of “reasonable accommodation” was developed for, and makes 
sense applied to, the Human Rights Code context where the dispute is be-
tween individual parties —employer and employee, landlord and tenant, 
retailer and consumer — who must “adjust the terms of their relationship 
in conformity with the requirements of human rights legislation, up to the 
point at which accommodation would mean undue hardship for the ac-
commodating party”.55  
In contrast, “a very different kind of relationship exists between a 
legislature and the people subject to its laws”: 
By their very nature, laws of general application are not tailored to the 
unique needs of individual claimants. The legislature has no capacity or 
legal obligation to engage in such an individualized determination and in 
many cases would have no advance notice of a law’s potential to infringe 
Charter rights. It cannot be expected to tailor a law to every possible 
future contingency, or every sincerely held religious belief. Laws of 
general application affect the general public, not just the claimants before 
the court. The broader societal context in which the law operates must 
inform the s. 1 justification analysis. A law’s constitutionality under s. 1 
of the Charter is determined, not by whether it is responsive to the 
unique needs of every individual claimant, but rather by whether its 
infringement of Charter rights is directed at an important objective and is 
proportionate in its overall impact. While the law’s impact on the 
individual claimants is undoubtedly a significant factor for the court to 
consider in determining whether the infringement is justified, the court’s 
ultimate perspective is societal. The question the court must answer is 
whether the Charter infringement is justifiable in a free and democratic 
society, not whether a more advantageous arrangement for a particular 
claimant could be envisioned.56 
 
While not new,57 this is a significant point and recognizes the inher-
ent difficulty in providing exemptions from legislation. It must be  
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remembered that the Amselem case arose in the context of a private rela-
tionship between a condominium corporation and a unit owner, and this 
provides an additional reason why the Court’s analysis in Amselem was 
not well suited to the legislative context. As we saw in Amselem, the ac-
tions of the condominium corporation related to private aims, with no 
broader public policy dimension. In such cases the Court must consider 
the concept of “accommodation” in the context of the particular interests 
of the parties before it. In the private context the Court can engage in a 
process that “takes into account the specific details of the circumstances 
of the parties and allows for dialogue between them”.58 The test for reli-
gious sincerity developed by the Court in Amselem is a test that should 
be applied to disputes between private parties when one party is seeking 
the accommodation of exclusively religious conduct with insignificant 
potential harm on the other party’s private interest. This is not the appro-
priate test to be applied in the legislative context to persons seeking 
exemptions from laws of general application, where the risk of false 
claims is high and the potential harm to the public interest is significant. 
The “broader societal context” referred to by the majority demands a dif-
ferent test for religious sincerity than the one developed in Amselem. 
The final stage in the Charter section 1 analysis — is the law propor-
tionate in its effect? — had previously been viewed by Professor Hogg as 
a “redundant” step in the section 1 analysis: “So far as I can tell … this 
step has never had any influence on the outcome of any case.”59 In resur-
recting the proportionality analysis, the Chief Justice explained that “the 
first three stages of Oakes are anchored in an assessment of the law’s 
purpose. Only the fourth branch takes full account of the ‘severity of the 
deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups’.”60 Thus, even 
where there are no alternative means reasonably capable of satisfying the 
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government’s objective, a law might still fail the proportionality analysis 
because “the deleterious effects are out of proportion to the public good 
achieved by the infringing measure”.61  
Significantly, Abella J.’s dissenting opinion, while reaching the op-
posite conclusion on proportionality, joins the majority in emphasizing 
the importance of this step in the section 1 analysis, stating that “most of 
the heavy conceptual lifting and balancing ought to be done at the final 
step — proportionality. Proportionality is, after all, what s. 1 is about.”62 
Justice Abella’s decision on proportionality reads like a looking-glass 
version of the majority’s. Where, for example, McLachlin C.J.C. gives as 
her example of the importance of proportionality a hypothetical law 
which is minimally impairing but still fails proportionality, Abella J.’s 
hypothetical is a law “which is not minimally impairing but may, on  
balance, given the importance of the government objective, be propor-
tional”.63 
After finding that the “salutary effects” of the universal photo re-
quirement for driver’s licences supported some restriction on freedom of 
religion, the majority went on to analyze the “deleterious effects” of that 
limitation on the Wilson Colony members’ exercise of their religious 
freedom. It is at this point that the communal aspects of freedom of  
religion entered into the analysis, making it clear that the impact of such 
restrictions on religious communities may be more significant than the 
impact of the same law on a “religion of one”. 
The Chief Justice’s opinion recites a number of considerations which 
the Court — and I would argue the state — must consider in undertaking 
this analysis. Is the practice — like prayer — central to the religious  
belief? Is it mandatory or optional? Does the limit amount to direct state 
compulsion on matters of belief or practices, or is it merely the incidental 
and unintended effect of a law of general application intended for the 
public good? Does the law prevent the religious practice, or does it just 
make the practice less convenient or more costly? These are all important 
questions, and to say, as Amselem does, that they are all infringements of 
Charter section 2(a) does not tell us that they should all be treated the 
same way under Charter section 1. That is one of the problems with Am-
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selem; it failed to make these important distinctions when setting out the 
test for religious sincerity. By acknowledging that these various consid-
erations are important to the section 1 justification analysis, the Court 
must recognize that they are all legitimate considerations for the legisla-
ture to take into account when it decides whether a religious exemption is 
appropriate and practical in the circumstances.  
The majority does consider the effect on the Wilson Colony’s “com-
munal life”, but finds that the evidence did not “support the conclusion 
that arranging alternative means of highway transport would end the Col-
ony’s rural way of life”.64 These alternatives will impose financial costs 
on the community “but they do not rise to the level of seriously affecting 
the claimants’ right to pursue their religion”.65 
In her dissenting opinion, Abella J. places somewhat more emphasis 
on the community or collective aspects of religious freedom. She states 
that the Hutterites’ inability to drive affects them not only individually, 
but also severely compromises the autonomous character of their reli-
gious community.66 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision indicates that while she agrees 
with Abella J. that:  
… religious freedom has both individual and collective aspects, I think 
it is important to be clear about the relevance of those aspects at 
different stages of the analysis in this case. The broader impact of the 
photo requirement on the Wilson Colony community is relevant at the 
proportionality stage of the s. 1 analysis, specifically in weighing the 
deleterious and salutary effects of the impugned regulation. The extent 
to which the impugned law undermines the proper functioning of the 
community properly informs that comparison. Community impact does 
not, however, transform the essential claim — that of individual 
claimants for photo-free licences — into a group right.67  
It is not clear to me that there is really any disagreement between the 
Chief Justice and Abella J. on this point. Justice Abella’s dissenting opin-
ion does state that both the individual and community68 aspects of religion 
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are engaged in this case, and then indicates that “[t]he nature of the reli-
gious right asserted will also be of relevance to the balancing of benefits 
and harms”69 under Charter section 1, which seems to be the same mode of 
analysis followed by the Chief Justice, albeit with a different result. 
Justice Abella’s analysis of the deleterious effects of the mandatory 
photo requirement does place particular emphasis on “the autonomous 
ability of the respondents to maintain their communal way of life”.70 She 
is critical of the majority for failing “to appreciate the significance of 
their self-sufficiency to the autonomous integrity of their religious com-
munity”.71 
The inextricably intertwined relationship between the Hutterian re-
ligion and the Wilson Colony community means that the deleterious 
effect of the mandatory photo requirement on the Wilson Colony mem-
bers will far exceed the impact of that same requirement on the 
idiosyncratic Mr. Bothwell. Justice Abella’s decision implicitly recog-
nizes this distinction when she concludes:  
The mandatory photo requirement is a form of indirect coercion that 
places the Wilson Colony members in the untenable position of having 
to choose between compliance with their religious beliefs or giving up 
the self-sufficiency of their community, a community that has 
historically preserved its religious autonomy through its communal 
independence.72  
Justice LeBel’s dissenting reasons place even greater emphasis on 
the communal aspects of religious freedom: 
Religion is about religious beliefs, but also about religious 
relationships. The present appeal signals the importance of this aspect. 
It raises issues about belief, but also about the maintenance of 
communities of faith. We are discussing the fate not only of a group of 
farmers, but of a community that shares a common faith and a way of 
life that is viewed by its members as a way of living that faith and of 
passing it on to future generations. As Justice Abella points out, the 
regulatory measures have an impact not only on the respondents’ belief 
system, but also on the life of the community. The reasons of the 
majority understate the nature and importance of this aspect of the 
guarantee of freedom of religion. This may perhaps explain the rather 
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cursory treatment of the rights claimed by the respondents in the course 
of the s. 1 analysis.73 
Thus, the decisions in Hutterian Brethren, and in particular the dis-
senting opinions, recognize an important facet of religious freedom — 
the maintenance of religious relationships and communities — that was 
noticeably absent from the Court’s decision in Amselem. 
V. A ROLE FOR CHARTER SECTION 27 — REDISCOVERING  
THE LOST ARK 
It is perhaps an oversight that neither Abella J. nor LeBel J. makes 
direct reference74 to the one section of the Charter that provides an ex-
plicit textual basis to support their heightened concern for protecting 
“communities of faith”. Section 27 of the Charter states: 
 27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians.  
This rarely relied-on section of the Charter75 is consistent with Abella 
and LeBel JJ.’s special concern for the community aspects of religion. 
Yet section 27’s acknowledgment of the importance of protecting and 
enhancing Canada’s multicultural heritage is nowhere to be found in the 
very individualistic definition of freedom of religion contained in Amse-
lem or, more importantly, in the Court’s test for religious sincerity. 
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Whether or not the state must give heightened protection to religious 
communities, surely, given the text of section 27, it cannot be faulted for 
doing so. Amselem suggests that the state is precluded from making this 
distinction — from tailoring a religious exemption so that it can be met 
by members of the Hutterian Brethren, but not by Mr. Bothwell (even if 
he were a sincere believer). 
The distinction made by section 27 is not between large communities 
and small communities. You do not get much smaller than the 250 or so 
Hutterites in Alberta, and they certainly qualify as part of Canada’s mul-
ticultural heritage. The distinction is between bona fide religious 
communities and “religions of one”. While section 2(a) of the Charter 
protects both individuals and groups, section 27 is concerned with com-
munities. At the very least, section 27 should mean that the government 
objective of promoting “communities of faith” is consistent with Charter 
values and deserving of additional weight in the section 1 balancing 
process. If this is correct, then the government must be permitted to es-
tablish religious exemptions which test for more than sincerity of belief. 
Religious exemptions should also be permitted to test for membership in 
a bona fide religious community. This additional requirement may not 
always be necessary, but Amselem is wrong to suggest that it should 
never be permitted. 
As section 27 recognizes the state’s interest in protecting religious 
communities, the state should be permitted to require evidence of a 
“shared and corroborated religious belief” in situations where (1) the risk 
of false or insincere claims for a religious exemption is real; (2) permit-
ting false claims for exemptions could compromise the government 
objective; and (3) the impact of denying sincere claims will be to under-
mine or threaten a community of faith that is a part of Canada’s 
multicultural heritage. 
The role of Charter section 27 may also help to explain why “free-
dom of religion” attracts greater protection than “freedom of 
conscience”. Professor Moon raises the conundrum created by the 
Court’s attempt in Amselem to distinguish “conscience” — involving 
“secular, socially based” beliefs — from “religion” — involving “the 
belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power”.76 Professor Moon 
points out that: 
if freedom of conscience and religion are part of a single integrated 
right, that protects deeply-held commitments or beliefs about right and 
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truth, there was no need for the Court to embark upon the difficult task 
of determining when a belief or practice is religious rather than 
secular.77 
But Moon concludes that Iacobucci J.’s decision in Amselem 
is workable only if the protection of … section 2(a) is confined to 
spiritual beliefs and practices or only if such beliefs/practices receive 
special protection under … s. 2(a). For it is difficult to see how a court 
could take such a broad approach to freedom of conscience, and extend 
protection to any belief/practice that an individual might consider 
important or valuable, but not obligatory. … It simply cannot be the 
case that any practice (not tied to a religious belief system) that an 
individual considers important but not morally necessary, is protected 
under the Charter and subject to restriction by the state only on 
substantial and compelling grounds.78 
And I would add to this observation the concern I have raised from 
the beginning: if all conscientious objections were constitutionally pro-
tected, what test would the state apply to determine sincerity of 
conscientious belief? How would the state, or even the Court, measure 
how “important” or “valuable”, or even “obligatory”, the particular con-
scientious belief was to the individual who claimed it? Moon’s answer to 
this conundrum is that religion is different precisely because of the com-
munity and cultural aspects of freedom of religion:  
Religious beliefs and practices may deserve special legal or 
constitutional protection not because they are an expression of 
individual autonomy or because they are divinely mandated but 
because they connect the individual to a cultural community or because 
they are part of his or her deeply-rooted cultural identity.79  
I agree with this observation, and point to section 27 of the Charter as the 
textual affirmation of this special constitutional status. 
The cultural aspects of freedom of religion also serve to answer an-
other question that has bothered me about the Amselem decision. The fact 
is that not all people who participate in religious practices do so “to  
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foster a connection with the divine”,80 to use Iacobucci J.’s words. There 
are, for example, individuals who self-identify as secular, atheist Jews, 
who build a succah (or participate in other Jewish rituals) every year in 
order to preserve their cultural identity and connection to their cultural 
community.81 Application of Iacobucci J.’s analysis in Amselem would 
result in the sincere believer in a divine being having the right to con-
struct a succah on his balcony; but if his neighbour were a secular atheist 
seeking to build a succah in order to preserve his cultural identity, the 
condominium corporation could prevent him from constructing the very 
same succah. This result strikes me as inconsistent with freedom of  
religion, and contrary to the values expressed in Charter section 27. I 
accept that the building of a succah is more “important” to the Orthodox 
Jew than to the secular atheist Jew, but given the trivial impact on the 
condominium corporation, I do not see why freedom of religion cannot 
accommodate both.  
This last point requires an explanation of what may appear to be a 
contradiction of my earlier observation that the building of a succah is an 
“exclusively religious” practice. How can I make that claim but then ar-
gue that a secular atheist may also want to build a succah? The answer is 
that the word “religious” should not be restricted to conduct connected to 
“spiritual fulfilment” or a “connection to the divine”. It should also in-
clude conduct connected to a religious community or religious custom — 
or, to use Professor Berger’s term, to religion as “religious culture”.82 If 
we are to take section 27 of the Charter seriously, atheists should also 
have the right to participate in the customs and practices of their religious 
communities. 
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